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artificial to make a distinction for those who move cargo directly off and
onto a ship.
Thus, while purportedly relying on the congressional intent in interpreting
the amendments, the court actually frustrated that intent, since thousands of
longshoremen, loading and unloading, subjected to the risks concurrent with
maritime employment, will be denied federal compensation if injured by the
"fortuitous circumstance" of being landward of the first and last points of
rest.
Ruth L. Russell

CIVIL PROCEDURE-Venue-A Defendant Has the Right to
Be Sued in County of Domicile When Suit Arises
Out of a Consumer Transaction
Amaya v. Texas Securities Corp.,
527 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Ramiro and Delia Amaya executed a written mechanic's and materialmen's lien contract with a paving company for making street improvements
on property adjoining their residence in Hidalgo County, Texas. Texas
Securities Corporation, as the assignee of the lien contract, brought suit in
Bexar County for non-payment of the debt, and to foreclose its lien on the
property. The defendants filed a plea of privilege to be sued in their county
of residence, and the plaintiff filed a controverting affidavit claiming that
venue was proper under Section 5(a) of Article 1995 of the Texas venue
statutes' because the lien contract stipulated that the obligation was payable
in San Antonio, Bexar County, Texas. 2 In rejecting the defendants' plea of
privilege, the trial court held that venue was proper in Bexar County
purusant to section 5(a) in that the defendants had contracted in writing to
perform an obligation in Bexar County. 3 The trial court added that Section
5(b) of Article 1995 was not applicable since the contract in question did
not constitute a consumer transaction. 4 The defendants appealed. Held1. TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 5(a) (Supp. 1975) states:
Contract in writing-(a) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (b), if a person
has contracted in writing to perform an obligation in a particular county, expressly
naming such county, or a definite place therein, by such writing, suit upon or by
reason of such obligation may be brought against him, either in such county or
where the defendant has his domicile.

2. Contract was payable at the office of Texas Securities Corporation in San
Antonio, Bexar County, Texas, but the actual contract was signed in Hidalgo County,
Texas.
3. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 5(a) (Supp. 1975).
4. TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 5(b) '(Supp. 1975) states:
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Reversed. Where a suit arises out of a consumer transaction for goods and
services intended primarily for personal, family, or household use, venue will
lie either in the county where the contract was signed or in the county in
which the consumer resided at the time of the transaction, regardless of
where the contract is made payable. 5
The general venue statute in Texas provides that no person who is an
inhabitant of this state is to be sued outside the county in which he has his
domicile. 6 The right to be sued in the county of one's own residence is a
valuable privilege 7 and advantageous to a defendant, for whose benefit it
was intended. 8 Though there are numerous exceptions to the general venue
statute, Texas courts have been reluctant to deprive a defendant of that right
unless there is some affirmative allegation that a specified exception exists. 9
To deprive a defendant of the right of trial in the county of his domicile, the
case against him must be brought within one of the exceptions found in the
statute.' 0
Prior to the adoption of section 5(b), it was rather easy for a creditor to
deprive a debtor of his statutory right to be sued in the county of his domicile
by simply inserting a provision in the form contract, making it payable in
some distant county."' As a result, the creditor would enjoy an advantageous bargaining position and, unknown to the debtor (consumer), venue
would unquestionably be established in the distant county by virtue of
section 5.12 This inequity was cured when the Texas Legislature revised
section 5.1- The revision now provides that the consumer be sued in a
In an action founded upon a contractual obligation of the defendant to pay money
arising out of or based upon a consumer transaction for goods, services, loans, or
extensions of credit intended primarily for personal, family, household or agricultural use, suit by a creditor upon or by reason of such obligation may be brought
against the defendant either in the county in which the defendant in fact signed
the contract, or in the county in which the defendant resides at the time of the commencement of the action.
5. Amaya v. Texas Sec. Corp., 527 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1975, writ ref'd n.r.c.).
6. Tnx. REV.

Cv. STAT.

ANN. art. 1995 (1964).

7. See Pool v. Pickett, 8 Tex. 122, 123 (1852); Holly v. Craig, 334 S.W.2d 586,
587 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1960, no writ); Russell v. Green, 214 S.W. 448, 449
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1919, no writ).

8. Pool v. Pickett, 8 Tex. 122, 123 (1852); accord, Cowan v. State, 356 S.W.2d

170, 172 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1962, writ dism'd).
9. See A.H. Belo Corp. v. Blanton, 133 Tex. 391, 395, 129 S.W.2d 619, 621 (1939);
Gilley v. Morse, 375 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1964, no writ).
10. City of Mineral Wells v. McDonald, 141 Tex. 113, 116, 170 S.W.2d 466, 468

(1943); Lindheim v. Muschamp, 72 Tex. 33, 35, 12 S.W. 125, 126 (1888); Stephens v.
Rhea, 342 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1961, no writ).

11. Brief for appellants, Amaya v. Texas Sec. Corp., 527 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Appellants were attempting to show the
inequity inherent in section 5 of article 1995 before it was amended.
12. The venue exception previously contained in subdivision 5 survives as subdivision 5(a) of the new statute.
13. See Sampson, Distant Forum Abuse in Consumer Transactions: A Proposed
Solution, 51 TExAs L. REV. 269 (1973).
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forum bearing a genuinei4relationship of the execution of the contract or to
the consumer's domicile.
Section 5(b) is closely patterned after California law. 15 Both statutes
borrow from the Uniform Commerical Code and rely heavily upon section 9109(1). 111 The underlying purpose of both state venue statutes is to protect
distant forum lawsuits that essentially deny the consumer
the consumer from
17
his day in court.
In Amaya v. Texas Securities Corp.,' 8 a case of first impression, the San

Antonio Court of Civil Appeals concluded that a paving lien was a consumer
transaction because it involved goods and services intended primarily for
personal, family, or household use.' 9 Consequently, venue was transferred
to Hidalgo County, the defendants' domicile, in accordance with section
5(b).

By placing venue in the defendants' county of domicile, the court's
decision in Amaya is significant for two reasons. First, section 5(b) has
unwittingly been transformed to an exception within an exception. What the
court in Amaya has apparently done is to shift the burden of proof to the
defendants. In utilizing an exception to article 1995, the burden of proof is
upon the plaintiff to establish a cause of action in his controverting affidavit; 20 but here, the court has made it incumbent upon the defendants 2 to
show that a paving lien is within the scope of a consumer transaction. '
Second, although the Texas venue statute has been strictly construed in
the past,2 2 the court in Amaya has apparently supplanted the usual strict
14. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 5(b) (Supp. 1975).
15. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 395(b) (Deering 1972) states in part:
[11n an action founded upon an obligation of the defendant for goods, services,
loans or extensions of credit intended primarily for personal, family or household

use . . . the county in which the defendant in fact signed the contract, the county
in which the defendant resided at the time the contract was signed, or the county
in which the defendant resides at the commencement of the action is the proper
county for the trial thereof.
16. TEx. Bus. & COMM. Code ANN. § 9-109(1) (Tex. UCC 1968) states: "Goods
are 'consumer goods' if they are used or bought for use primarily for personal, family or

household purposes."

17. Sampson, Distant Forum Abuse in Consumer Transactions: A

Proposed

Solution, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 269, 286 (1973). For instance, by designating the place of
payment at a substantial distance from where the transaction occurred, the creditor could
deprive the consumer of his right to subpoena witnesses.
18. 527 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
19. Amaya v. Texas Sec. Corp., 527 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
20. See A.H. Belo Corp. v. Blanton, 133' Tex. 391, 396, 129 S.W.2d 619, 622

(1939); Furr's Super Mkt., Inc. v. Jernigan, 380 S.W.2d 193, 194 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1964, no writ).

21. Amaya v. Texas Sec. Corp., 527 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio
1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
22. See National Life Co. v. Rice, 140 Tex. 315, 322, 167 S.W.2d 1021, 1025
(1943); Brown v. Clary, 315 S.W.2d 385, 386 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1958, no writ);
Old Lincoln County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hall, 214 S.W.2d 203, 204 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Dallas 1948, no writ).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

3

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 8 [2022], No. 1, Art. 16

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 8

construction of the venue statute, as a whole, with a liberal interpretation of
the phrase "consumer transaction" as found in section 5(b). In construing
the term "consumer transaction," the court found it necessary to rely upon
other codes and statutes, specifically the Uniform Commercial Code, 28 the
Federal Truth in Lending Act, 24 and the California Civil Code.2 5 Despite
the varied sources, a common denominator is apparent: The intended use of
the goods or services is the determinative factor. As noted in Amaya, the
factor which distinguishes a "consumer transaction" from other transactions
is the intended use of the goods, services, or loans. 26 By making "intended
use" the determinative factor, the court in Amaya has properly construed the
intent of the Texas Legislature for, when it enacted section 5(b), the
legislature was utilizing Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code in the
2
proper manner.

7

If the court in Amaya had so desired, both the Texas Consumer Credit
Code 28 and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection
Act 29 could have provided it with an even broader background of what
might constitute a consumer transaction since both statutes have expanded
the meaning of consumer goods to include the improvement or repair of real
property. Without the aid of these statutes, the court concluded that even
though pavement does become a part of the realty, it is insufficient grounds for
23. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9-109(1) (Tex. UCC 1968).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (1970) states:
The adjective 'consumer', used with reference to a credit transaction, characterizes
the transaction as one in which the party to whom credit is offered or extended
is a natural person, and the money, property, or services which are the subject of
the transaction are primarily for personal, family, household, or agricultural purposes.
25. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1802.1 (Deering 1972) states:
'Goods' means tangible chattels bought for use primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes, including goods which, at the time of the sale or subsequently
are to be affixed to real property as to become a part of such real property whether
or not severable therefrom ...
Id. § 1802.2 states:
'Services' means work, labor, and services for other than commercial or business
use, including services furnished in connection with the sale or repair of goods as
defined in Section 1802.1 or furnished in connection with the repair of motor vehicles or in connection with the improvements of real property.
26. Amaya v. Texas Sec. Corp., 527 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
27. TEx. Bus & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9-109(1)

(Tex. UCC 1968).

When the

Texas Legislature enacted section 5(b), it incorporated section 9-109(1) of the Uniform
Commerical Code practically verbatim.
28. TEx. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-6.01(a) (1971) states in part:
'Goods' means all tangible personal property when purchased primarily for personal,
family or household use and not for commercial or business use, including such
property which is furnished or used at the time of sale or subsequently, in the modernization, rehabilitation, repair, alteration, improvement or construction of real
property so as to become a part thereof whether or not severable therefrom.
Section 6.01(b) states in part: "'Services' means work, labor, or services of any kind
when purchased primarily for personal, family or household use and not for commercial
"
or business use .
29. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.45 (Supp. 1975) states:
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detracting from its character as "goods." This conclusion was evidently
propounded in light of the Uniform Commerical Code's non-applicability to
realty. But, there is nothing in that Act which specifically precludes a court
from applying its rules to realty. Thus, the court has apparently transcended
the Uniform Commerical Code's restriction to personalty. A literal reading
of the sections cited to the Texas Consumer Credit Code and the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act provides support for this
contention.
In construing a paving lien to be a "consumer transaction," the court
apparently interpreted section 5(b) of the Texas venue statute to be
remedial in nature.3 0 Consequently, under Texas law, a statute remedial in
nature is entitled to the most comprehensive and liberal construction possible. 3 ' Furthermore, since the San Antonio court did rely upon the Uniform
Commercial Code in determining that a paving lien is a consumer transaction, the basis for that determination is entitled to as liberal a construction as
possible.3 2 In an official comment to the applicable section, the Code's
draftsmen add that the Act should be developed by the courts in the light of
33
unforeseen and new circumstances and practices.
California, in construing the Uniform Commerical Code, particularly

section 9-109(1), has interpreted it liberally.

4

It applies the simple test

used in Amaya: The principal use to which the property is put is considered
as determinative.3 5 Other jurisdictions have consistently held that anything
which is used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes consti30
tutes a consumer good.
In Castleberry v. Acco Feeds,37 decided prior to Amaya, the Eastland
(1) 'Goods' means tangible chattels or real property purchased or leased for use.
(2) 'Services' means work, labor, or service purchased or leased for use, for other
than commercial or business use, including services furnished in connection with the
sale or repair of goods.
30. Remedial in the sense that the Texas Legislature attempted to correct the
problem of distant forum abuse and, in so doing, promote justice.
31. See Mason v. West Texas Util. Co., 150 Tex. 18, 29, 237 S.W.2d 273, 280
(1951); Cruzan v. Walker, 119 Tex. 189, 191, 26 S.W.2d 908, 909 (1930); Sheppard's
Home v. Wood, 140 S.W. 394, 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911, no writ).
32. Tax. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 1-102(a) (Tex. UCC 1968).
33. Id. § 1-102, comment 1.
34. E.g., Vasquez v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 811
(1971) (purpose of Act is to protect consumers, and should be liberally construed to that
end); Morgan v. Reasor Corp., 73 Cal. Rptr. 398, 403 (1968).
35. James Talcott, Inc. v. Gee, 72 Cal. Rptr. 168, 171 (Ct. App. 1968).
36. Bennett v. W.T. Grant Co., 481 F.2d 664, 665 (4th Cir. 1973) (household
laundry dryer); In re Williams, 10 UCC Rep. Serv. 277, 281 (D. Me. 1971) (mobile
home); In re Ten Brock, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 712, 714-15 (W.D. Mich. 1966) (campertrailer); In re Nicolosi, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 111, 112 (S.D. Ohio 1966) (ring); Atlas
Credit Corp. v. Dolbow, 165 A.2d 704, 708 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1960) (motor boat);
Mallicoat v. Volunteer Fin. & Loan Corp., 415 S.W.2d 347, 349-50 (Tenn. App. 1966)
(automobile); Commercial Credit Equip. Corp. v. Carter, 516 P.2d 767, 770 (Wash.
1973) (airplane).
37. 525 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, no writ).
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Court of Civil Appeals was confronted with whether a transaction was a
"consumer transaction" within the meaning of section 5(b). The plaintiff
claimed that a rancher, who had purchased feed for his cattle, had an
extensive operation, worth over $350,000 and spread over 3,000 acres of
land. The plaintiff maintained that this was not the type of transaction the
legislature contemplated when it enacted section 5(b). The court rejected
the plaintiff's argument, holding that the plaintiff's cause of action was
"founded on a contractual obligation of the defendant rancher to pay money
arising out of a consumer transaction for goods intended primarily for
agricultural use,"8 8 and was thus within the scope of section 5(b).39 The
court reasoned that section 5(b) was applicable because it found that the
intent of the legislature, evidenced by the language used in the statute, was
40
controlling.
Though the facts are dissimilar, the case illustrates the proper method for
determining whether a transaction is a "consumer transaction" by looking to
the intended use of the goods or services. In Castleberry, the goods were
intended for agricultural purposes; therefore, the transaction was a "consumer transaction" within the meaning and intent of section 5(b). In Amaya,
the goods, services, and extensions of credit were for personal, family, and
household purposes; paving the street which abutted the defendants' residence made it easier for them to come and go. This, the court concluded,
was also a "consumer transaction."
With the passage of numerous consumer protection laws throughout the
country, it is obvious that the plight of the consumer is in the minds of legislators and judges alike. In regard to consumer goods, Texas apparently
will follow the "intended use test" wherein the intended use to which the
goods are put will be considered as determinative. It is likely that any goods
used or bought for use primarily for personal, family, household, or agricultural purposes, will be considered consumer transactions. Undoubtedly, the
court's decision in Amaya will be criticized as too broad and liberal in its
interpretation of section 5(b). As one judge has stated, however, "even the
recently retired 'Queen Mary' could qualify as a consumer goods [sic] if
purchased by a billionaire for his own personal use .... ,,4
Sylvester Anthony Mauro
38. Id. at 285.
39. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 5(b) (Supp. 1975) provides in part:
"intended primarily for personal, family, household or agricultural use."
40. Castleberry v. Acco Feeds, 525 S.W.2d 282, 285 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1975, no writ).
41. In re Trumble, 5 UCC Rep. Serv. 543, 544 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
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